Palavras-chave
Brasil
Evitando ganhos abaixo de zero
Evitando reduções de ganhos
Manipulando a disposição da propriedade
Como Citar
Resumo
Objetivo – Poucos estudos analisaram como os gerentes das empresas manipulam as atividades comerciais para atingir os limites de lucros das empresas brasileiras listadas em bolsa. Este estudo investiga se as empresas brasileiras listadas em bolsa manipulam suas atividades comerciais para atingir seus limites de lucros.
Referencial teórico – Este estudo verifica se as empresas brasileiras listadas em bolsa manipulam as atividades comerciais para atingir seus limites de lucros e se esse comportamento é consistente com a teoria da sinalização.
Metodologia – Empregamos o modelo de Deng (2018) e analisamos como as empresas manipulam seus lucros usando ganhos ou perdas com a disposição de bens e se elas tentam atingir seus limites de lucros evitando perdas e reduções de lucros. Um modelo de regressão é então usado para verificar se a manipulação afeta o desempenho no período seguinte (ou seja, a sinalização). São examinadas 314 amostras de 49 empresas brasileiras listadas em bolsa no período de 2011 a 2018.
Resultados – A maioria das empresas brasileiras listadas em bolsa não manipula seus ganhos ou perdas com a disposição de bens para evitar perdas ou reduções de lucros, e a manipulação não afeta o desempenho no período seguinte. Portanto, a sinalização não reflete expectativas futuras, rejeitando a teoria da sinalização.
Implicações praticais e sociais da investigação – Os gerentes de empresas podem controlar cuidadosamente as atividades operacionais. Os credores podem monitorar as transações comerciais. Os contadores devem prestar atenção ao monitoramento de seus ganhos reais, buscando alinhar o exercício do julgamento do gerente com práticas que melhorem a qualidade das informações contábeis. O conselho de administração pode fortalecer seu controle sobre o comportamento de disposição de bens dos gerentes da empresa.
Contribuições – Este estudo é o primeiro a verificar o comportamento de manipulação de resultados das empresas brasileiras usando a teoria da sinalização. Também analisamos a manipulação de ganhos ou perdas com a disposição de bens para abordar a lacuna na literatura.
Palavras-chave – limites de lucros, Brasil, evitando ganhos abaixo de zero, evitando reduções de ganhos, manipulação da disposição de bens
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